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BOOK REVIEW
POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND
FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION,

1940-1975. By James E. Krier & Edmund Ursin. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1977. Pp. ix, 401. $15.95.
In Los Angeles one is dependent upon what one drives. The
automobile dominates the form and society of much of urban
America, but nowhere is its dominance more pronounced or socially costly than in the Los Angeles region.' The Los Angeles
Basin rivals the Mediterranean and Dalmatian coasts as one of the
world's most hospitable environments, and the high amenities offered by the region's climate promoted its growth. 2 However, meteorological conditions and society's insistence on the freedom of
mobility offered by the automobile have combined to degrade the
Los Angeles Basin's air.
Although smog is now present in many urban centers, including the currently popular "life style" cities of Denver, San Francisco, and Washington, the phenomenon of persistent air pollution
was first perceived as a problem commanding public attention in
Los Angeles. From 1940 to 1967, Southern California alone attempted to cope with the relationship between the automobile and
air pollution;3 now the problem is a national one. 4 Thus, the
story of how local, state and federal institutions defined California's problem and attempted to solve it is important not only for
its own sake, but for the insights the experience provides for the
entire country.
Since 1950, the automobile has been identified as the major
cause of smog, yet we are still discovering how difficult it is to
reduce mobile source pollution. Reduction of mobile source pollution is both a technological and political problem, for hard
1. For a readable discussion of the impact of the automobile on American life,
see E. ROTHSCHILD, PARADISE LOST: THE DECLINE OF THE AUTO-INDUSTRIAL AGE

(1973).
2. M. SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 185 (1969).

3. Muskie, Role of the FederalGovernment in Air Pollution Control, 10 ARIZ. L.
REV. 17, 18 (1968).
4. The Environmental Protection Agency recently reported that 103 out of 105
urban areas with a population of 200,000 or more violate the photochemical oxidant
standard. Only Spokane and Honolulu meet the standard. 5 Hous. & DEV. REP.
(BNA) 1008 (1978).
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choices must be made between the benefits of cleaner air and the
costs of emission reduction. Pollution and Policy by James Krier
and Edmund Ursin tells the story of Los Angeles's, California's,
and finally the federal government's attempt to reduce air pollution by regulating the design, performance, and use of the automobile.
The authors have a good story to tell, and they tell it well.
Pollution andPolicy is a study of the search for a scientific understanding of the causes of smog, the effort to solve the problem by
relating emission standards to health impact and then implementing a technological fix, and finally the alarming realization that
the key to a rational approach to the problem lies as much in the
way we use cars as in the way cars are designed. In short, the
story of the attempt to eliminate automobile-caused air pollution
is a classic case study of the inability of technology alone to solve
environmental problems and of the need to consider abatement
strategies involving more fundamental changes in the way we live
and organize our economy, which at the same time are related to
rational choices about desirable abatement levels. Professors
Krier and Ursin have blended together two schools of policy evaluation, the Wisconsin law-in-action tradition and the newer welfare economics analysis of resource allocation, to form a general
essay on environmental regulation.
There are many dimensions to the analysis of the institutional
responses to air pollution that are relevant to a full understanding
of the efficiency of the regulatory process. Political scientists focus primarily on the allocation of regulatory authority among local, state, and federal governments and on the clash of
personalities inherent in the evolution of public policy. Sociologists study the relationship between the formulation of public
opinion and governmental response. Economists study the least
costly method of efficiently allocating the right to use a common
property resource. Engineers work on least cost technological solutions, while scientists study the causes and effects of air pollution. All of these aspects are dealt with in the book, often with
considerable originality. For example, the authors' treatment of
the role of crises on interest group organization and institutional
response is particularly insightful.
Some fundamental themes, such as the growing federal control of air pollution regulation between 1960 and 1970, have been
described elsewhere, while much of the history of local and state
regulation is recounted for the first time. However, the authors'
analysis of these important dimensions of the problem is not the
most significant achievement of the book. The major contribution of Professors Krier and Ursin to our understanding of envi-
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ronmental policy is their analysis of the interplay among
inadequate scientific understanding of the cause and effects of air
pollution, the resultant difficulties of the legal system when permanent technological solutions are attempted, and the problems
resulting from the addition of quickly formulated behavior modification programs to already controversial technology-forcing solutions. Regulatory institutions established to deal with air
pollution struggled to formulate a technological solution in the
face of two levels of uncertainty. Scientists and engineers could
not tell these regulators the rough correlations between emissions
and health hazards nor could the engineers guarantee that engine
modifications would reduce emission levels to a desired level
without more costly side effects. 5 This uncertainty is not troublesome so long as society makes the simplistic assumption that any
discharge of residuals into the air equals pollution; however, it becomes critical when a more sophisticated approach to emission reduction is contemplated.
A rational approach to air pollution starts from the assumption that although degradation of the ambient air can be observed
by the eye or in the laboratory, its presence alone does not insure
that there is a pollution. Ideally, sufficient scientific information
would be assembled to delineate the damage caused by air pollution and a cost-benefit analysis would be undertaken to decide
how much emission reduction society should demand. If the degradation caused no or little damage-short or long term-there
would be no pollution. Lawyers want to know the causal relationship between specific pollutants and quantifiable losses, but,
unfortunately, scientific information rarely provides much more
than a delineation of the risks of certain types of diseases being
exacerbated by certain pollutant levels.
The problem of estimating cause and effect is especially acute
with mobile source pollution, and the authors can be faulted for
not focusing sufficiently on the technical problems of damage estimation and pollution measurement. The first part of the book is
a straightforward description of who did what, when, and how.
However, when the authors turn to a general criticism of what
they view as irrational federal air pollution policy after setting out
the case study, they fail to outline the technical problems which
must be solved before a more rational policy can be developed.
This omission somewhat blurs the focus of the case study's analysis.
5. See F. GRAD, A. ROSENTHAL, L. ROCKETT, J. FAY, J. HEYWOOD, J. KAIN, G.
INGRAM, D. HARRISON, & T. TIETENBERG, THE AUTOMOBILE AND THE REGULATION
OF ITS IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 31-66 (1976) for a survey of the efforts to
predict health and other aspects of air pollution.
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In Los Angeles, the adverse impacts of smog have always
been assumed. Consequently, the issue in Los Angeles has been
what causes smog and how can it be eliminated, not how much
should be tolerated. Smog was observed in 1940, but a decade
passed before the automobile was identified as its major cause.
From 1940 to 1950, the city and state proceeded on the assumption that smog was a traditional, stationary source problem. Not
until 1950 did a California Institute of Technology scientist identify the car as the major source of pollution. It took another six or
seven years to win acceptance from the scientific community and,
more importantly, from the automobile industry, that motor vehicle exhaust did in fact produce smog. Subsequent research has
validated the long-standing concern over automobile exhaust
emissions, but for somewhat different reasons than were originally
assumed. During the time of the study, however, the evidence on
automobile exhaust damage was very sketchy.
Important as damage estimation is in theory, it is not a necessary condition for government action. As a recent report has concluded, "[einvironmental damage functions are not to be
considered as the ultimate tool which will indicate or dictate the
policy path to be taken."'6 Of necessity government has the power
to set environmental quality standards on the basis of general risk
levels. 7 Yet, although emission reduction standards may be established on the basis of available information, the underlying scientific uncertainty constrains society's response to the problem,
for it diminishes the legitimacy of the regulatory process created
to solve the pollution problem.
Our tradition of due process requires that no sanction be imposed without substantial proof that the action to be sanctioned
caused injury to society or an individual. In most cases this is not
difficult to establish, although assembling the necessary evidence
may be costly. However, in the area of environmental law, it is
very difficult to establish that certain activity causes injury.
Linkage of specific pollutants to specific property damage or personal injury is difficult. Many of the health hazards are the result
of the cumulative impacts of exposure to a pollutant. It is therefore difficult to establish that a regulation mandating emission reduction decreases injury. Thus, due process requirements that
the state make a reasonable effort to establish that an activity
causes recognized injury, and, perhaps more importantly, that the
proposed regulatory solution will at least contribute to reduction
6. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
NOMIC MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 14 (1976).

Eco-

7. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
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of the injury, are often a heavy burden for the legislature and its
administrative delagees to meet.
California's early attempts to meet air quality and emissions
standards illustrate the constraining impact of these due process
considerations. Initially, the acceptability of anti-pollution standards was judged by ordinary due process standards. In Chapter
9, "Dealing with Uncertainty: Setting Pollution Standards," the
authors masterfully trace the state's response to uncertainty in its
attempts to set fair standards. It was assumed that "in direct applications of technology lay the key to relief,"' 8 and that automobile engine modifications should be supported by traditional cause
and effect evidence. These assumptions proved too simplistic.
In most cases the scientific evidence was not available and there
was insufficient awareness that increases in the level of automobile useage tend to cancel technologically produced emission reductions. California's problem was exacerbated by the
automobile industry's refusal to make smog control a high research priority and by a well documented conspiracy among the
major companies to stifle research which would give one company
a competitive advantage over another. Nonetheless, the state
forged ahead with efforts to control air pollution through air quality and emission standards.
Beyond the damage estimation problem, automobile emission standards are very difficult to set as it is hard to determine
the impact of automobile pollution on ambient air quality. Emissions are a function of the design of the automobile's crankcase,
fuel tank and carburetor, and exhaust system. Each component
can be modified, but changes in design and engine operation must
be based on average performance conditions when in fact engine
usage varies considerably during a typical driving trip. More importantly, the level of pollution reduction is a function of engine
design, engine operation, and the amount of driving in an area.
California struggled with these problems in the 1960s, arbitrarily,
but moving cautiously in setting air quality standards and less
cautiously in setting emission standards. The state's standards in
the end were a difficult to understand compromise:
One cannot help but be struck by the difference of approach as between air quality and emission standards. Regarding the former, the standard-setters tolerated some
uncertainty but refused to render judgments in the case of hard
uncertainties-in instances, that is, where the data that existed
was regarded as insufficient. (The criteria for gauging sufficiency were not expressed.) With respect to emission standards, on the other hand, there appeared to be considerably
more tolerance of uncertainty; the standard-setters plunged in
8.

J.

KRIER &

E.

URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY

95 (1977).
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despite severely limited knowledge. That information was at
best scant (especially regarding hydrocarbons) seems unquestionable: there were considerable "uncertainties . . . in the

measurement of motor vehicle emissions as well as of pollutants from other sources" and there was only "rudimentary"

knowledge "regarding the quantitative relationships between
photochemical smog effects and the concentrations of the primary smog-producing pollutants." The department's report itself noted a number of strong uncertainties. For example:
"The measurement of the exhaust hydrocarbon loss is a very
difficult problem. The analytical methods for hydrocarbons
have never been considered to be satisfactory enough for standardization." Or, regarding the averaging approach, it was recognized that its reliability depended upon "the distribution of
emissions after a control program is implemented." Yet the
department recognized that "it is not possible to predict the
shape of [the distributional] curve." As a final example, emission standard-setting required "a hypothesis concerning the relationship of smog effects to contaminant concentrations ...
The evidence currently available is not conclusive and in some
instances appears to be contradictory. Nevertheless, thefollowing equations areproposedas a basisforpredictingthe effects of
exhaust contaminant control" The report went on to propose

(and employ) the relationships, though it recognized they were
"simplifications which do not fully comprehend the variety of
photochemical reactions possible." It did so on the basis of
"experimental evidence."
Why were the standard-setters willing to confront strong
uncertainties (both empirical and theoretical) in the case of
emission standards, choosing to rely on "assumptions" and experimental evidence, yet unwilling to proceed in the same manner with respect to air quality standards, insisting instead on
"more data on human exposures"? Put more succinctly, why
were judgments made on the basis of "present knowledge" in
the case of emission standards, but often abjured in the case of
quality standards? 9
Professors Krier and Ursin carry their story forward to the
passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) abortive implementation of the Act in
Southern California. These developments, familiar to most students of environmental law, are only summarized in the book.
Those wishing a detailed analysis of the programs and of the complex federalism question subsequently raised by the cases must go
elsewhere.' 0 The post-1970 developments complete the historical
9. Id. at 128-29 (footnotes omitted).
10. During 1970, the EPA experimented with indirect source controls and automobile use modification programs. The EPA attempted to force states to adopt specific programs as part of state implementation plans. The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Pamph. 1977), have limited
EPA's authority so that the federalism problems being litigated in cases arising out of
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backdrop for an important chapter in which the authors attempt
to identify the elements common to environmental regulation and
the way in which these elements interact. A theory of the causal
sequence of environmental policy is developed through classification of the stages of regulatory policy evolution according to the
problem most common to each. As with all theories of policy
formulation, the utility lies in the individual insights the study
yields rather than in the final generalizations.
Much like Willard Hurst's works, this chapter defies easy
generalization; the authors are careful to avoid loose statements
and each step in the analysis is tightly drawn with the appropriate
qualifications. But, this caveat aside, the basic thesis of the authors is this: Pollution regulation proceeds by a series of least
steps. The primary reason for the hesitation is that the initial uncertainty over the causes and effects of air pollution and the effectiveness of emission reduction technologies shifted the burden of
justifying air pollution reduction to the state, thus delaying implementation of comprehensive abatement strategies. The automobile industry was able to make a case for no control by forcing the
state to justify control measures. The state's inability to make
benefit-risk calculations under existing common law and the administrative agencies' constrained standard setting procedures led
to regulatory inertia until environmental crises and a resulting
process of "exfoliation" (elimination of causes rather than discovery by study) produced knowledge sufficient to allow the regulatory system to go forward.'
The final portion of the chapter turns to the question of what
lessons the pre-1970 regulatory experience holds for the post-1970
experience. Federal intervention after 1970 was quick and radical compared to the least-step process which preceded it. Between 1973 and 1976, the EPA attempted to impose controls on
automobile use which included gas rationing and carpools. The
program, as the authors describe in Chapter 13, consisted of illthought out strategies of behavior modification which collapsed in
the face of public opposition to radical change and to income redistribution aspects of the program perceived to be unfair.
California and elsewhere have been mooted in some instances. See Brown v. EPA,
566 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1977). The constitutional problems of the EPA's attempt to
mandate state enforcement strategies on top of federal standards stems from National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which prohibits the federal government from "displacing the State's freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
Id. at 852. See Stewart, Pyramidsof Sacritraditional government functions ......
fice? Problems of FederalMandatingState ImplementationofNationalEnvironmental
Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
11. Id. at 307.
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Krier and Ursin argue that the failure of the EPA's mobile
source regulations can be traced to an earlier unwillingness to articulate a rational pollution control policy. Since Pollution and
Policy is ultimately an argument for an examination of decentralized rather than centralized regulatory strategies, the authors'
identification of uniform air quality and emission standards as the
critical irrationality in federal policy is logical. Much of the
EPA's effort to impose uniform environmental standards supports
the argument that we need to experiment with what the authors
call "management standards" 12 which eschew exclusive reliance
on technological fixes. Thus, in this writer's opinion, the major
lesson Krier and Ursin draw from the case study is the right one.
Still their explanation of the EPA's failures in terms of uniform
standards leaves the reader with a paradox which is presented, but
left unexplored. The first part of Chapter 13 seems to suggest
that pre-197 0 regulatory programs were hampered by inadequate
authority. Yet, the post-1970 regulatory programs too were
largely failures despite the EPA's having all the authority earlier
federal and state agencies lacked. Instead of attempting a full
analysis of this paradox, the authors choose to articulate a theory
explaining why decentralized solutions should have emerged and
then turn to an easy attack on the persistence of uniform standards:
The government initially intervened to allocate the air resource
because breakdowns in the system of incentives led to undue
pollution. While the resource was sufficiently valuable to justify intervention, its value was small enough (the problem was
serious, but not that serious) that the gains from an efficient
allocation by the government would not be worth the information or administrative costs associated with achieving them. So
uniform regulations, which, thanks to their crudeness, entail little in the way of such costs, were used. Over time, however,
increasing scarcity (and thus value) of the resource in both absolute and relative terms made efficiency gains more worth12. Krier and Ursin recommend that Congress experiment with a management
standards approach which they define as follows:
The concept of management standards is based on technical, economic,
and social feasibility. It envisions a series of time-phased steps in each
of which there must be achieved substantial percentage reductions in
the number of days per year in excess of federally specified uniform
ambient concentration standards. Ultimately, this number would be
reduced to the point where further reductions in the area in question
would not be worth the costs of attaining them. Management standards thus aim at long-term (but not uniform) improvements, but they
insist in the meantime upon short-term accomplishments that exhaust
all feasible controls and that enhance air quality relative to what it was
before. The central purpose of the management standards approach is
to take into account, in a manageable way, the varying problems and
conditions that exist in different areas.
Id. at 329-30.
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while, while associated administrative costs remained more or
less fixed. When value increased sufficiently, one might then
expect to see some shift toward pricing systems in order to realize those efficiency gains, because the higher administrative
costs associated with such systems would now be worthwhile
and also lower than the administrative costs of a regulatory system equal in allocative efficiency. Perhaps this is one underlying reason why, early in the 1970s, one heard not only that the
supply of environmental amenities "has fallen far short of the
rising effective demand

. . .

and the supply of certain critical

goods, such as pure air and water, has virtually vanished" but
observed as well a new interest in pricing. Such speculation is
underscored by the fact that mention of increasing concern
about environmental resources at times
went hand-in-hand
13
with comment upon the new interest.
The thesis that "[t]he failings of present policy to realize announced ends are due in part to the legacy of earlier efforts;" arresting as it is, is ultimately an inadequate explanation for post1970 EPA policy and its failures. The reasons are two-fold.
First, on the methodological level, the final part of the book is too
radical a shift from the case study preceeding it. The authors turn
from a detailed factual problem to broad discussion of air pollution control strategy, only some of which is directly relevant to the
problem of mobile source air pollution. Second, the thesis fails to
account adequately for the adoption and maintenance of uniform
air quality standards; because it does not accord sufficient weight
to the impact of scientific uncertainty about the causes and effects
of air pollution on standard setting. Krier and Ursin rightly suggest that uniform standards were adopted when the air pollution
was serious, but not that serious, and when air resources were valued less highly than they are today. Because the excessive cost of
acquiring accurate information to implement a variable standards
strategy could not be justified, they surmised that as the resource
increased in value and more was known about alternative regulatory strategies, government sought least cost solutions such as decentralized pricing systems. However, they fail to appreciate
sufficiently that while the value of the resources was increasing,
the information which caused society to place a greater value on
clean air resources suggested that there were substantial health
and other risks to many emissions. Instead of deciding which
risks should be tolerated and which not, society chose a "conservative" strategy of minimizing all risks. This approach is fundamentally inconsistent with efficient implementation strategies,
since a risk analysis should question the legitimacy of accepting
any pollutant level as acceptable. The net result was that concerns arising from the uncertainty countered any pressure for al13. Id. at 304-05.
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ternative regulatory approaches. Krier and Ursin discuss the
problem of uncertainty only to reject the principle of absolute risk
minimization as a justification for the failure to attempt a costbenefit analysis in setting air quality standards. 14 Their explanation for the failures of post-1970 environmental policy is not
wrong, but a more complete analysis of post-1970 developments is
needed for the development of a powerful general theory.
The last chapter, "Some Comments on Present Policy," turns
from an analysis of the impact of uniform standards to a criticism
of their effect, and suggests a decentralized management approach
to emission reduction. Krier and Ursin argue that the uniform air
quality and vehicle emission standards required by the Clean Air
Act make this federal legislation inefficient and unfair. The Act
allows California to set higher automobile standards, but in all
other respects it preempts state mobile source regulation.' 5 Similarly, air quality standards may be raised by the states, but they
may not be lowered. Although the 1977 Amendments temper the
standards by extending full compliance until 1985, the end result
6
is not changed; federal standards remain high and uniform.1 It
has long been argued that since air quality varies from region to
region, uniform standards are per se inefficient because they fail
to minimize costs. As the authors point out, "[tjo require adherence to the same stringent standard everywhere will in many areas
result in the imposition of control costs that are much larger than
the pollution costs avoided." 17 The standard efficiency defenses
of uniform standards are: (1) uniform standards are necessary to
insure protection of the health of everyone; (2) uniform standards
are necessary to protect states desiring clean air; (3) uniform
standards are necessary to prevent competition among states in
the form of limited rights to pollute; and (4) granted that such
standards allocate resources inefficiently, in the long run they are
the least costly alternative because they can be implemented more
cheaply than other systems which require more information concerning damage levels and the marginal costs of industries. The
authors ably refute these defenses. Once one concedes that air
quality is a commodity like wheat or corn, these defenses fall.
Any regulatory system which fails to take into account the opportunity costs of alternative resource allocations is presumptively
inefficient, especially given the rising cost curves for the final in14. Id. at 320-21.
15. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7507, 7543 (West Pamph. 1977). The 1977 Amendments,
however, permit any non-attainment state to adopt California standards. Id. § 7507.
16. Id. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(ii)(II) (new motor vehicle standards). See also id. §
7502(a)(2) (allowing extensions through 1987 for states in non-attainment 'areas to
achieve the federal ambient air quality standards).
17. J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 8, at 314.
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crements of pollution control elimination. Scholarship published
after this book confirms the strength of these arguments with respect to mobile source pollution.18
One final consideration remains. If uniform air quality
standards cannot be justified on efficiency grounds, can they be
justified on fairness grounds? Clean air is a possible candidate
for the Rawlsian difference principle.19 Rawls would allocate basic resources so that the least disadvantaged group in society
would readily consent to a different allocation because the minimum allocation is satisfactory. This analysis could quickly lead
to high uniform standards. The authors' discussion of this argument is brief, but they do make one telling point. An air pollution policy based on the principle of protecting the health of
everyone at equally high levels has severe and perverse redistribution consequences. The cost of high air quality will be borne in
part by the poor who already pay a relatively higher proportion of
their income for cars, gasoline, and lost employment opportunities. Many people will be forced to purchase health risk minimization insurance at levels higher than they would choose even
after reasonable disclosure of the risks of exposure.
My only objection to the Chapter's analysis is that the narrow
focus on uniform standards somewhat weakens its applicability to
a problem as dynamic as mobile source pollution control. For
example, the authors fail to distinguish between uniform air quality standards and uniform mobile emission standards, and argue
that both should be non-uniform. They do not, however, dispose
of the argument that because of the migratory nature of automobile ownership and the concentrated nature of the automobile industry, engine design and emission standards should be
uniform. 20 Of course, it does not follow that air quality standards
need to be uniform. Nonetheless, the problems of mobile source
pollution control would be roughly the same in many areas of the
country regardless of whether air quality standards were uniform
or variable. To carry forward the lessons of their California case
study, the authors would have had to grapple with many questions
such as: by what standards and processes should variable standards be set for different regions, what should be the mix of technology-forcing and automobile use modification strategies to
achieve the objectives, and finally, can decentralized control systems such as fuel or driving taxes work as a practical matter? The
authors instead sketch a proposal for setting non-uniform standards which require the greatest reductions in the most polluted
18. L. LAVE & E. SESKIND, AIR POLLUTION AND HUMAN HEALTH (1977).
19. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
20. See J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 8, at 342-44.
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areas and urge the consideration of management strategies such as
21
regional gasoline allocations which would limit the total supply.
Still as it stands, the Chapter is a good general essay on uniform
air quality standards which would be better if it were linked to the
problems of the case study.
Pollution and Policy is a fine, thoughtful piece of research.
Its willingness to question premises which most other writers assume and its wealth of documented information concerning the
implementation of an important regulatory program distinguishes
it among the environmental law literature. Many may find the
theses advanced wrong or inadequate, but all should find them
provocative. Further serious scholarship in this area must directly confront Pollutionand Policy by either refuting its powerful
thesis or improving upon its creative analysis.
A.

21. Id. at 336-339.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
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